Ò»¡¢½²×ùÌâÄ¿£ºMoney Talks? An Experimental Study of Rebate in Reputation System Design
by Lingfang (Ivy) Li (ÀîÁá·¼) (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics ) & Erte Xiao (Carnegie Mellon University)
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Îå¡¢ÄÚÈݼò½é£ºReputation systems that rely on feedback from traders are important institutions to help sustain trust in markets, while feedback information is usually considered as a public good. We conduct experiments to study how the raters¡¯ feedback behavior responds to different reporting costs and how to improve the market efficiency by introducing a pre-commitment device for sellers in reputation system. In particular, the pre-commitment device we study here is to allow a seller to provide rebates to cover buyers¡¯ reporting cost before buyer¡¯s purchasing decision. Using a buyer-seller trust game, we find the propensity to leave feedback is more sensitive to reporting cost when the sellers cooperate than when the sellers defect. The seller¡¯s decisions on whether to provide a rebate significantly affect buyers decisions of leaving feedback as the rebates compensate the feedback costs. More importantly, the rebate decision have a significant impact on buyer¡¯s purchasing decision via signaling the seller¡¯s cooperative type.
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