Öйú¾¼ÃÓë¹ÜÀíÑо¿Ôº
Yuliy Sannikov½ÌÊÚ10ÔÂ28ÈÕ-11ÔÂ6ÈÕ
¡¶¹«Ë¾²ÆÎñ¡·¿Î³ÌÔ¤¸æ
ÆÕÁÖ˹¶Ù´óѧ¾¼Ãϵ½ÌÊÚYuliy Sannikov½«ÓÚ2009Äê10ÔÂ28ÈÕ-11ÔÂ6ÈÕÔÚÖйú¾¼ÃÓë¹ÜÀíÑо¿Ôº½²ÊÚ¡¶¹«Ë¾²ÆÎñ¡·(Corporate Finance) ¿Î³Ì£¬ÇëÖйú¾¼ÃÓë¹ÜÀíÑо¿Ôº¸÷Äê¼¶Ñо¿Éú×öºÃ×¼±¸£¬Í¬Ê±Ò²»¶Ó±¾Ð£ÆäËûԺϵÒÔ¼°ÆäËû¸ßУ¸ÐÐËȤµÄʦÉúÃâ·Ñ²Î¼Ó¡£
¿Î³Ì¼ò½é£º
This short course focuses on informational problems in corporate finance and includes topics such as contracts, capital structure and financial intermediation, with some connections to the business cycle. The goal is to develop modeling skills and understanding of how results are derived from assumptions. There will be in-class group problem-solving exercises to understand the papers better. Also the second week will include several student presentations (see papers marked by ¡®*¡¯below). The overall objective is to develop theoretical research skills.
ÔĶÁÊéÄ¿£º
The Irrelevance of Capital Structure 1. Modigliani, F. and M. Miller (1958) ¡°The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance and the Theory of Investment,¡± American Economic Review, Vol. 48, No. 3 (Jun., 1958), pp. 261-297
Asymmetric Information and Signaling 2. Ross, S. (1977) ¡°The Determination of Financial Structure: The Incentive-Signaling Approach,¡± Bell Journal of Economics 3. Leland, H. and Pyle, D. (1977) ¡°Informational Asymmetries, Financial Structure, and Financial Intermediation,¡± Journal of Finance 4. Myers, S. and Majluf, N. (1984) ¡°Corporate Financing and Investment Decisions When Firms Have Information That Investors do not Have,¡± Journal of Financial Economics 5. DeMarzo, P. and D. Duffie (1999) ¡°A Liquidity-Based Model of Security Design¡± Econometrica
Financial Intermediation and the Business Cycle 6. Townsend, R. (1979) ¡°Optimal Contracts and Competitive Markets with Costly State Verification,¡± Journal of Economic Theory * 7. Diamond, D. (1984) ¡°Financial Intermediation and Delegated Monitoring,¡± Review of Economic Studies. * 8. Diamond, D. and P. Dybvig (1983) ¡°Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance and Liquidity,¡± Journal of Political Economy 9. Bernanke, B. and Gertler, M. (1989) ¡°Agency Costs, Net Worth and Business Fluctuations,American Economic Review. * 10. Kiyotaki, N. and J. Moore (1997a) ``Credit Cycles¡¯¡¯, Journal of Political Economy 11. Brunnermeier, M. and Y. Sannikov (2009) ¡°A Macroeconomic Model with a Financial Sector,¡± working paper Dynamics of Conflicts between Debt and Equity 12. Leland H. (1994) ¡°Corporate Debt Value, Bond Covenants, and Optimal Capital Structure,¡± Journal of Finance
Incentives and Moral Hazard 13. Bolton, P. and Sharfstein, D. (1990) ¡°A Theory of Predation Based on Agency Problems in Financial Contracting,¡± American Economic Review 14. DeMarzo P. and Y. Sannikov (2006) ¡°Optimal Security Design and Dynamic Capital Structure in a Continuous-Time Agency Model,¡± Journal of Finance * 15. Edmans, Gabaix, Sannikov and Sadzik (2009) ¡°Dynamic Incentive Accounts.¡±
ÉÏ¿Îʱ¼ä¡¢µØµã£º
|
ÐòºÅ |
ÈÕÆÚ |
ÉÏ¿Îʱ¼ä |
ÉϿεص㣨ÖÐÑë²Æ¾´óѧУÄÚ£© |
|
µÚ1´Î¿Î |
10ÔÂ28ÈÕ ÐÇÆÚÈý |
ÍíÉÏ 6£º30-9£º30 |
ÖвƴóÏÃÈý²ãͨ1 |
|
µÚ2´Î¿Î |
10ÔÂ29ÈÕ ÐÇÆÚËÄ |
ÏÂÎç 2£º00-5£º00 |
ÖвƴóÏÃÈý²ãͨ1 |
|
µÚ3´Î¿Î |
10ÔÂ30ÈÕ ÐÇÆÚÎå |
ÏÂÎç 2£º00-5£º00 |
Ö÷½Ì217 |
|
µÚ4´Î¿Î |
10ÔÂ31ÈÕ ÐÇÆÚÁù |
ÉÏÎç 9£º00-12£º00 |
ÖвƴóÏÃÈý²ãͨ1 |
|
ÖÜÈÕÐÝÏ¢ |
|
|
|
|
µÚ5´Î¿Î |
11ÔÂ2ÈÕ ÐÇÆÚÒ» |
ÍíÉÏ 6£º30-9£º30 |
ÖвƴóÏÃÈý²ãͨ1 |
|
µÚ6´Î¿Î |
11ÔÂ4ÈÕ ÐÇÆÚÈý |
ÍíÉÏ 6£º30-9£º30 |
ÖвƴóÏÃÈý²ãͨ1 |
|
µÚ7´Î¿Î |
11ÔÂ5ÈÕ ÐÇÆÚËÄ |
ÏÂÎç 2£º00-5£º00 |
ÖвƴóÏÃÈý²ãͨ1 |
|
µÚ8´Î¿Î |
11ÔÂ6ÈÕ ÐÇÆÚÎå |
ÏÂÎç 2£º00-5£º00 |
Ö÷½Ì217 |
ÖÐÑë²Æ¾´óѧµØÖ·£º±±¾©Êк£µíÇøÑ§ÔºÄÏ·39ºÅ¡£³Ë×ø16·¡¢645·¡¢651·¡¢849·¹«¹²Æû³µ¾ù¿Éµ½´ï¡£
»¶Ó¸÷ԺУÏà¹Ø×¨Òµ¸ÐÐËȤµÄʦÉúÃâ·Ñ²Î¼Ó£¡
Öйú¾¼ÃÓë¹ÜÀíÑо¿Ôº
2009Äê10ÔÂ20ÈÕ |